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INTRODUCTION
This paper will provide the reader a framework by which to understand the unintended consequences of the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 directed outsourcing/privatizing and downsizing of the military in general. Downsizing has reduced the active duty military personnel pool that accomplishes an increasingly complex and diverse mission. This downsizing, coupled with outsourcing/privatizing and an ever-expanding mission, has increased the operations tempo for today's military members from both an operational mission perspective, but also with regard to accomplishing a fixed number of numerous "military unique" details and additional duties. These duties, such as honor guard, Resourced Augmentation Duty (READY) program, search and recovery teams and "weeds and seeds" do not earn manpower but must continue to be performed as additional duties by the smaller pool of military members that remain. Commanders have always been responsible for a certain amount of workload that must be "taken out of hide", but now the "hide" is much thinner than ever before. This paper will review three areas of unintended consequences: mission accomplishment, fiscal concerns and morale issues. The impact of these consequences in each of these areas is equally important, with potentially long-ranging affects, particularly in areas such as retention and recruiting and ultimately, mission capability.
Chapter 2 Current Force Structure/Ops Tempo Situation
Most of the change we think we see in life is due to truths being in and out of favor.
-Robert Frost (1874 Frost ( -1963 Current Force Structure vs. Historical.
The end of the Cold War and fiscal constraints in the country at the time, led to popular thought that the military should be downsized in the early 1990s. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM put the cuts on hold, but plans were already underway to cut the size of the armed forces in half once the crisis was over. In fact, reductions had already taken place and during the fiscal year Operation DESERT SHIELD began, both the Army and the Air Force had the lowest number of personnel on duty since 1950.
Once the war was over, downsizing kicked into gear full-force with a nine percent reduction in FY92. This translated into an average of 1,000 service members leaving the military services every 24 hours. For the Air Force, this translated to a reduction of 7.9 percent for 1992 and a total reduction of 22.7 percent since 1986, leaving an end-strength of 470,315.
1 As of September 30, 2001, the Air Force had a total active duty force of 358,800, another 24 percent reduction since 1992 and a 41 percent reduction since 1986.
The Air Force also had a civilian personnel workforce of 161,870 and a total ready reserve of 231,299.
2
Although demobilization and mass exodus following a war were normal in previous conflicts, what was different this time was that for the first time, this force was allvolunteer who for the most part, had hoped to make the military a career. 3 An interesting statistic, is that by 1998, the DoD had borne some 80 percent of all government cutbacks with the loss of 355,000 civilian and 743,000 military slots.
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Current Ops Tempo vs. Historical.
"The productivity of the Services has been compromised, and ever-increasing numbers and types of missions with continual demands to do more with less have led to increasingly stressful lives. For example, in 1998, the Navy reported a 7,200 recruitment shortfall, while the Air Force had less than a 20 percent success rate in the area of pilot retention. Marines were deploying once every 5 weeks compared to once every 15 weeks just 10 years ago. According to Major General Charles R. Henderson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, the Air Force is deployed more than twice as often now as in 1989. Additionally, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who are not deployed are working longer hours to make up the difference." 5 In 1999, the Air Force had an average of 12,000 airmen deployed per day, while 10 years ago, that number was around 2,000. There is a significant amount of work that goes on at a base that is not accounted for anywhere on a unit-manning document. There are numerous reasons for this to include:
Congress authorizing programs without appropriating additional manning to run the programs (two-member honor guard for every veteran funeral), peacetime authorizations not matching contingency requirements (increase in Force Protection condition), and unrealistic funding for installation maintenance (not getting funded for one percent of plant replacement value.) In addition, some of the manpower earned from justified workload, was wiped out when the Air Force went to the objective wing construct in
1992.
In some cases, major commands (MAJCOMS) removed all unfunded authorizations from the UMDs, making it appear as though the unit's requirements were funded to 100 percent. The workload didn't go away; just the ability to advocate for the bodies to get it done.
"Everything is a priority" syndrome.
It is a reality now (at least at base-level if not everywhere) that everything must be done and it must be done now. The Air Force has less funding and fewer people, yet is busier than ever before. Nonetheless, its people are expected to produce as much as before. Unfortunately, when everything is a priority, in the end, nothing is a priority.
The Air Force has continued to accomplish the mission only because of its superior 7 Brenda Morrison, 42d ABW/MO, Maxwell AFB, interviewed by the author, 11 Nov 02 people who will somehow find a way to make it happen because they do not want to say they cannot.
Workload distribution via use of technology.
Yet another way that workload has merely been redistributed versus reduced is the continuing trend toward decentralizing primarily administrative functions such as concerns about whether these projected savings are realistic. They state that the estimated savings are based on unverified projections rather than actual results and where audited, the reality did not match the projections, even though the costs of the competitions were not taken into consideration. In talking with base officials, the GAO found that many expressed concern that personnel downsizing had already eliminated much of the potential for outsourcing to achieve additional personnel savings. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has said they are concerned that the projected savings of 20 to 40 percent reported from A-76 competitions are not reliable. 15 For one thing, a competition can take as long as two years to complete and cost as much as $2,500 per job studied (in some cases, this estimate is reported to be as high as $9K.) "A-76 can be a long and difficult process that's painful to the command and disruptive to the workforce. It's not an easy sale," says Jerry Stark, the Marine Corps' deputy director for installation reform.
16 "Fundamentally, outsourcing is the pursuit of reduced employee labor costs at a break-even quality." While there are other ways of reducing costs (velocity management, process reengineering, single-stock funds, use of technology, etc.), none produce results as quickly as payroll reductions. 17 In addition, as soon as the announcement of an A-76 study is made, the military authorizations assigned to that workload are deleted and the long tortuous process of losing them through attrition begins.
Competitive sourcing under A-76 has also been the subject of much controversy from both the public and private sector. General to convene a panel of experts to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of federal government commercial activities to the private sector. The most serious shortcoming of A-76 that the Panel found was that the process had been stretched beyond its original purpose. A-76 was originally designed to determine the low-cost provider of a defined set of services but now, competitions seek to identify the best provider in terms of quality, innovation, flexibility, and reliability.
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Although the resulting outcome is potentially much better for the agencies involved, the concern is that the A-76 process may no longer be the best one to achieve the desired objectives.
Workload unmeasured in the A-76 process.
There have been numerous problems for the Air Force with the A-76 process but one of the most painful for base-level is the fact that there is so much workload involved in running a base that is not included in the competition process. As discussed earlier, there are numerous "out-of-hide" functions, which earn no manpower but nevertheless, must be done. This workload is often not included in the outsourcing statement of work. Once the contractor wins the contract and the military and/or civilian authorizations are deleted from the books, there is no longer anyone in the organization to do that workload. The only answer is to pay the contractor more to do the additional workload (funds are almost always not available) or, which is often the case, expect military personnel in other units pick up the slack. As the GAO discussed in their 1997 report to Congress, competition, not outsourcing, has been the key to savings. Data shows that winners of competitions, whether the government MEO or a contractor, generally used fewer people to do the work.
19
"The work" however, is the previously measured workload on which the manpower provided was based. It does not include all the additional duties that must be 18 
Ancillary Benefits of A-76.
Although data validating the purported 20 to 40 percent savings is hard to find, there is no doubt efficiencies have been achieved. This is largely in part because just even the possibility of an outsourcing study forces leaders to think about streamlining, reorganizing and reengineering their organizations. When forced with an actual study, leaders must evaluate the productivity/usefulness of every worker, just as civilian industry does all the time. This can encourage good workers to do even better, and highlights the sub-par performers even more. In the best of cases, this allows poor employees to be culled from the workforce prior to a RIF which can force good and poor workers out indiscriminately.
Another potential benefit of an A-76 study is it may improve management/union relationship, at least temporarily. Both management and union leaders realize they must work together to become more efficient so they can win the Most Efficient Organization 
Unintended Consequences
Introduction.
Although there are documented positive results from outsourcing and privatization (such as some cost savings, smarter utilization of available military manpower, and capitalization on unique skills some contractors have), there have also been numerous unintended negative consequences of the effort. These consequences span the full spectrum, but can probably be grouped into three main areas: mission accomplishment, fiscal, and morale.
Mission Accomplishment.
President Bush said, "we must put strategy first, then spending. Our defense vision will drive our defense budget, not the other way around." Unfortunately, that is not necessarily the case. A-76 and downsizing is more about building organizations that are designed to be most efficient during peacetime versus truly effective on the battlefield. Force's organic workforce (military and civilian) often work more than the standard 40 hour workweek without compensation and accomplish the tasks required regardless of whether these tasks were included in their position description. It is not until the function is contracted out, and the work goes undone because it was not specified in the contract, that the Air Force realizes there is a problem. By that time, a modification to the contract is often cost-prohibitive. The bottom line is that the contractor, no matter how dedicated to the Air Force mission (and there are some who are), is in business to make a profit. If he doesn't charge the Air Force for the service he is providing, he won't be in business long. During the A-76 of the base operating support (BOS) at Maxwell AFB, a trio of contractors was hired to write the performance requirements document (PRD) at a cost of $3.4M. A relatively short document considering the workload it was describing, the PRD was written in a non-specific manner and cited the Air Force Instructions (AFIs) to describe the specific workload to be accomplished. Unfortunately, the Services Squadron leadership at that installation has not found AFI citation to be enough to force the contractor to accomplish the intent of the AFI. This is usually due to some ambiguity on the part of the AFI. Some specific examples of this include: (1) contractor refuses to organize/provide support for the Air Force Tops in Blue performance without an additional $10K payment and, they say it will take them one month to plan the support, (2) contractor disagrees with requirement to hold NAF Council meetings, and (3) contractor has determined they do not need to have a trainer that provides face-to-face training to Services personnel but rather they can do the training by video, and (4) they have chosen not to offer oil changes at the Auto Hobby Shop which the AFI says "may be provided", even though it means a significant reduction in revenue generated. 22 "One of the hardest things for military personnel to do is to learn to interpret a contractual agreement literally, to assume nothing." 23 This is very different from working with military members and civilian employees with whom a willingness to do whatever it takes to get the job done is implicit. Contractors simply operate in a different culture. Yes, there are recourses for the government to get the contractor to comply, but often these processes are labor and time intensive and viewed as more trouble than they are worth, at least over the short term. In addition, the incentives for contractors to continuously improve and go above and beyond are usually not the same as for the in-house workforce. Some types of contracts may provide monetary incentives for contractors who perform exceptionally well, but the funds must be available in the first place for this to occur. This often leads to lower expectations from senior leaders when a function is contracted out. A level of performance that would not have been acceptable from a blue suiter or civilian worker is now accepted from a contractor and even worse, any remaining in-house workforce will be expected to pick up the slack. An example of this is at an AETC base where the senior ranking individual on the base continues to demand extensive, labor intensive monthly briefings on the Services operation, even though the now contracted area responsible for producing those briefings refuses to since it isn't in the contract. The senior leader hasn't backed off on requiring the briefings so the organization chief and deputy spend a large portion of their time building the briefings every month. over the loss of blue suit manpower, finding it difficult to field READY augmentees for mobility lines and other details such as weeds and seeds, honor guard, and search and recovery team. There are also concerns about CONUS bases losing the benefit of rotating military that bring new talents/expertise to the table; will these bases stagnate due to low turnover?
Finally, there is some concern that outsourcing and privatization is not being accomplished in a standardized manner. The Air Force has in many cases, allowed "county option" whereby commanders are strongly encouraged to contract out base support functions. Some wings, for example, have turned the majority of their civil engineering functions over to contractors, while others have not. Due to the move to the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) structure, there is now growing concern over the lack of organic engineering skills at some locations. 27 Lack of organic capability is often exacerbated by a lack of adequate funding to buy inorganic capability.
Fiscal.
The increase in contracts translates directly into more of a Wing Commander's budget tied up in must-fund contracts thereby leaving her less discretionary funds for people programs. This is often exacerbated by the fact the contracts are not always written as well as they should be. revert back to a government in-house work force -the funding, positions, and people are no longer available. Ultimately, service suffers, the desired end state contracted for does not happen, and employees must be hired to perform the work on a temporary basis until the contract can be reworked. Subsequently, a work force that is already overworked and undermanned must now provide the required management oversight. This added stress becomes even more critical when viewed in the light of today's operating tempos."
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The Air Force once used primarily statements of work (which provide very specific guidance) to identify the work to be accomplished, then transitioned to performance or outcome based contracts. Unfortunately, this was not the panacea in all cases as highlighted by a recent case within the Maxwell Services Squadron. The marketing function was direct converted (a process for organizations with less than 10 personnel, that transitions to contract without competition) and after the contract was in-place, leadership decided to ask for a monthly magazine for advertisement versus the bi-weekly newsletter called for in the contract. As a result of the change, the contractor came back with a request for $45K in additional compensation, (when the entire contract for marketing is only worth $100K), even though the workload was actually less than originally requested and replaced something already in the contract. AETC is now considering going back to the statement of work type of contracts over concerns that performance based contracts are more prone to encourage cost creep. Another significant unintended consequence is budget disconnects due to incorrectly estimated cost savings. As of 1 Jan 02, the Air Force Audit Agency picked up responsibility for independently reviewing the costs associated with all A-76 studies.
After one of these reviews at MacDill AFB, FL, they reported that the A-76 study at the 6 th Air Mobility Wing overstated cost savings of four direct conversion contracts by a total of over $9 million. Most of this was in the civil engineering area and regarded 33 CMSgt Redfield-Lyon 34 Les Coalson, HQ AETC/SV2, E-mail sent to author, subject: "Unintended Consequences of A-76", 10/24/02 personnel costs. 35 In some cases, inadequate oversight is the culprit. At the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center at Tinker AFB, OK, the AFAA found that DynPar, LLC submitted invoices for 9 months and was paid nearly $93,0000 for the Pest Management Services even thought they did not perform this work.
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In the case of Services squadrons, many of their functions such as mess attendant functions in dining facilities, were outsourced before A-76 really came into vogue.
Unfortunately, this outsourcing was done without the competitive process required by A-76. In addition, many of these contracts went to the National Institute for the Severely Handicapped (NISH) or small business (8A) contractors. These contracts have a congressional law that gives them many priorities over other type of companies. "In ACC's experience in mess attendant and food service, the costs averaged almost 30 percent more than a similar sized base that was able to go to a competitive source.
Moreover, once a NISH contractor gets it unless they give it up they have it forever and it is never re-competed." 37
Morale.
Economics should not however, be the overriding factor in the decision-making process. The human factor is significant and must not be ignored. Unfortunately, its relationship to military readiness and preparedness is hard to quantify. to have low morale because they must now do not only their jobs, but that of their coworkers who were cut. And, they know that if further cuts are required, they could be next.
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For military members in a career field that is outsourced or privatized, there are fewer and fewer places they can be stationed. Usually, this means they can only go overseas, or to a continental United States (CONUS) base which has significant deployment responsibilities. Both of these options can offer a significant reduction in quality of life and therefore retention. Compounding that trend is the fact that privatization provides civilian job opportunities for skilled military members. Just when the military gets a member fully trained, he can easily be wooed to leave the military and go to work for the contractor. In the long term however, industry will also lose out because their primary source of trained and uniquely skilled labor is eroding. Ultimately, this will come back to bite the military in the form of increased contractor costs.
43
The impact of all these unintended consequences has yet to be fully realized. There can be no doubt though, that there will be impacts and they will pose some new challenges with which leadership at all levels will have to deal.
Ellison 43 Zamparelli
Chapter 5
Impact of Unintended Consequences
When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change.
Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland (1610-1643)
Short-term.
In light of the current debate about whether or not the U. Force protection is a huge issue now and the increased number of contractors in theater has definitely complicated this concern. Commanders are required to provide security for these noncombatants but these personnel may not be living or performing their jobs at the base or compound. They may have family accompanying them, and they are not required to observe the same restrictions as military members. Further adding to the problem is the fact that these personnel cannot augment the force protection experts.
As the contractor to military member ratio increases, fewer and fewer military members are available to provide the full-range of support (including force protection) that is the onion a few layers and you come away with the conclusion that they want our people.
They hope to come in and bid our work, hire our people, get extremely lean and efficient and use the remaining workers to service business backlog that they now face."
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One of the facts this article points to is that these government reformers "forget or never bother to calculate the stimulation that government paychecks have in the economy." Whereas in the private sector, a firm can hire more workers when business 51 Zamparelli 52 Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Outside-the-Box Thinking Spurs Air Force Competitive Sourcing", SIGNAL Magazine, June 1998, 27 Oct 02 requires it and lay them off in a downturn that is not the case in the government.
Unfortunately, the trends of outsourcing, privatizing and downsizing are contributing to the destruction of good, tax-base creating jobs in the public and private sector. After all, the bottom line on cost reduction through outsourcing and privatization is that savings are accomplished by reducing the price of the employee. Basically, outsourcing and privatization is taking good paying, middle class, tax-base-creating jobs a rarity. Michael
Brower says that "the impulse to outsource and privatize in order to save the taxpayer money is a noble goal. But when the majority of taxpayers are the very workers injured in the process, caution and case-by-case consideration is prudent." 53 "When the vogue of O&P fades, its legacy will be one of short-term profit, long-term economic instability and a degenerated level of national security-all at the expense of average defense workers who are O&P's chief source of value and profit." 
